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Abstract—Concerns over the security and privacy of patient
information are one of the biggest hindrances to sharing health
information and the wide adoption of eHealth systems. At
present, there are competing requirements between healthcare
consumers’ (i.e. patients) requirements and healthcare profes-
sionals’ (HCP) requirements. While consumers want control
over their information, healthcare professionals want access
to as much information as required in order to make well-
informed decisions and provide quality care. In order to balance
these requirements, the use of an Information Accountability
Framework devised for eHealth systems has been proposed. In
this paper, we take a step closer to the adoption of the Information
Accountability protocols and demonstrate their functionality
through an implementation in FluxMED, a customisable EHR
system.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Privacy is a critical but unfavourably defined concept,
subjected to culturally dependent variables [1]. Privacy of
an individual is breached when control over their personal
information is lost to that individual [2]. eHealth systems and
health service improvement are hindered by privacy concerns.
The privacy and security of health information is a crucial
factor in the success or failure of digital healthcare systems.
The exposure of this information can cause significant reper-
cussions to the individuals. At the same time, not having such
information available when it is needed can lead to inaccurate
decision making and avoidable and potentially life threatening
clinical errors while providing clinical care. When protecting
this information, both technical and human factors must be
considered.
Many patients prefer the ability to control and restrict access
to their health information; however, healthcare providers
believe that patient’s restricting access to their electronic health
records (EHRs) would be detrimental to the quality of care
[3]. This conflict between patient privacy desires, the needs of
healthcare professionals (HCPs), and the quality of healthcare
can be seen in the recent review of Australia’s national Per-
sonally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) system
[4]. A balance must be found between these often competing
concerns if such systems are to succeed.
Aiming to achieve this balance, we developed the Infor-
mation Accountability Framework (IAF) [5], which provides
the assurance of holding individuals accountable when health
information exchanges take place. The IAF makes use of
defined policies to determine appropriate use, with policies
able to be defined based on types of data being accessed, the
context of the information access (i.e. patient consultation),
the purpose of its use, the role of the individual accessing
the information, and so forth. These policies can be complex
and specific, or broad as needed for a given type of data.
Structured, policy-aware provenance logs of all information
access events in the system are used to hold users accountable
for their actions in a system [6].
In this paper we will demonstrate implementing the IAF
protocols in FluxMED, a customisable EHR system designed
to easily collect and manage different types of medical data
[7]. FluxMED enables medical specialists to customise the
handling of different types of data in a specialised way
without changes to its code. Data collected in the system
is highly structured, and use of the system is defined in
workflows. Each activity in the system is made up of events
such as a consultation, an exam or test performed, with specific
information included in attributes.
Figure 1 illustrates how FluxMED can be used. Each step
in the doctor’s consultation or exams that have been requested
or any other relevant information is represented by an activity
in a workflow. FluxMED presents the set of activities that
have been executed, and the set of new activities that can be
executed at any point. In Figure 1, two activities have been
executed, Identification, and First Index Event. There are three
new activities that can be executed at this point, shown below
in the second activity. In this case the user has selected the first
of the new activities, and the right side frame shows the data
that can be entered to register this activity. This example is
Fig. 1: FluxMED NMO-DBr Workflow
taken from the NMO-DBr, the Neuromyelitis Optica Database,
developed with FluxMED [8]. FluxMED allows each activity
to have a different set of access permissions, being an ideal
platform to illustrate the functionalities of IAF protocols.
We begin our discussion in Section II with a description of
the IAF protocols and how they can be applied. In Section III,
we describe the FluxMED system. Section IV discusses how
the protocols were implemented into the FluxMED workflows,
and demonstrates their functionality within the system. Sec-
tion V concludes the paper with a discussion of future work.
II. INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK
Information Accountability is a concept that involves using
policies and mechanisms to enforce appropriate use through
after-the-fact accountability for intentional misuse. IA mech-
anisms do not replace, but instead augment, traditional pre-
ventative measures that expect a user to be authorised to
take an action in a system before attempting to do so. We
define eHealth systems that implement IA mechanisms as
Accountable-eHealth (AeH) systems.
By implementing non-restrictive access to information for
legitimate users, AeH systems fulfil the information require-
ments of healthcare professionals. The presence of these IA
mechanisms act as a deterrent for misuse to users through
disincentives in the form of accountability entailed by penalties
[9]. Misuse refers to the unauthorised access, use, modifica-
tion, or disclosure of information, or other use of information
that is not for the purpose for which the information was
provided [10, 11]. Much like in the offline world we live
in, it is expected that when users are aware of the account-
ability measures, they would not engage in inappropriate
activities [12]. As a result, AeH systems allow information
to be made available to legitimate users more openly and
effectively without threatening patients’ information privacy.
The knowledge of the existence of accountability mechanisms
and the transparency of system activities are incentives for the
subjects of the information, i.e. patients, to increase their trust
in the system.
A primary concern that accountability protocols, such as
those defined in the IAF, aim to address is with ‘insider
threats’, which include accidental disclosures, insider curiosity
and data breach by an insider [13]. Insider threats are a
Fig. 2: Accountable-eHealth flow
significant issue when ensuring the privacy and security of
patient data, with 17.5 percent of all health provider privacy
breaches that were made public in the US between 2005 and
2014 being due to insider threats [14].
In devising the IAF for use in eHealth, we initially modelled
four types of users: data owners (i.e patients), data users
(i.e healthcare professionals) using health information for
legitimate purposes, data users who misuse health information,
and a central health authority (HA) (i.e. a government agency).
Data owners have explicit control over which of their preferred
HCPs can access their information and are able to set usage
policies to grant or limit access further. The HA is in place
to ensure that HCPs always have access to the information
they need to provide appropriate care through setting default
policies, without unnecessarily hindering the patient’s privacy
[15]. The patient and HA policies are amalgamated to produce
a resulting usage policy for a given HCP.
As policy-aware transaction logs are a key component of
accountability systems [16], in the IAF all information access
and other events in the system are logged along with policy
used to determine whether the action should be permitted.
These logs provide the provenance of the information data
in the system, which can be compared to usage policies to
determine if an action complied with those policies [17]. The
information these logs contain can also be considered sensitive
and must be protected [18]. These logs are made available
to the data owner in a user-friendly format which they can
review at any time. The IAF actively monitors all actions taken
in the system for potential breaches of policy and provides
notifications as needed. For example, when a HCP makes an
invalid access request, the system notifies the patient of the
potential misuse of their eHealth information with a log that
can be reviewed and referred to when submitting an inquiry
asking the HCP to justify their actions [6].
When the system detects possible misuse of a patient’s
health data, the patient is able to submit an inquiry asking for
a justification of the actions taken by the relevant HCP. The
HCP must then provide an explanation to justify their need to
access the relevant information. Once this is done, the system
uses a semantic reasoner and rules defined by a HA along
with the context of the information access, usage policies, and
the HCP’s justification to determine whether misuse occurred
and further investigation is required. An example of a possible
flow of this model is shown in Figure 2.
This model has been validated using prototypes and surveys
conducted into user acceptance, but it hasn’t been fully imple-
mented. In order to take a further step in the implementation of
the IAF in eHealth systems and the development of AeH sys-
tems, we will demonstrate the use of the IAF in combination
with the FluxMED EHR system.
When implementing the IAF protocols into an EHR system
such as FluxMED either natively or as a service, it is important
that the eHealth data is structured so that the type of data being
accessed can be matched with usage policies. Additionally,
the EHR system must be modified to log all events with
the context of the event and policy used to permit or restrict
access to the information. It must also be possible for HCPs to
override patient usage policies when the need arises while the
system provides clear communication to the HCP that their
action is being recorded and may be investigated if misuse
is suspected. This will often require appropriate changes to
the front-end of the EHR system as we will demonstrate in
FluxMED.
III. FLUXMED
FluxMED is an EHR system that has been designed to be
powerful and flexible. Typically EHR systems belong to one
of two categories. They can be too rigid in the types of data
that can be stored, limiting severely the symptoms, exams,
diagnostics that can be used, allowing data only from the
limited set of pre-specified information that has been coded
into the system. Frequently doctors complain that such systems
force them to enter the data in ways that are not appropriate
because there is no way of changing the types of data that are
accepted.
As a way of compensating for this problem, the other type
of system is too generic, allowing the doctor to enter free text
describing the patients consultation. Data entered in this way
is very difficult to analyze, because each doctor specifies a
different set of symptoms, treatments and so on. Frequently
data from one consultation to the other is not comparable [19,
20].
FluxMED takes a different approach, making it possible
to standardize the types of data entered by defining them in
a workflow. These can be changed easily, incorporating new
knowledge without changes to the system. It can be used in
very flexible ways, for example, if different doctors follow
different diagnostic strategies, that is, ask different questions,
and request different exams, the workflow can incorporate both
methods, and let the doctor choose which one to use.
Data entered in this way is structured to make it easy
to analyze it later. Data is not entered in free text format,
but in formats that have fixed types and requirements, which
simplifies posterior analysis.
We have used FluxMED to develop EHR systems for three
different diseases that are complex, difficult to diagnose and
to treat. But because they are not common diseases, EHR
systems aimed at them are non existant or very difficult
to access. FluxMED has been able to model data from
patients of neuromyelitis optica, paracoccidioidomycosis and
adrenoleukodistrofy and enable doctors to use the system to
initiate and follow patient treatments.
An important aspect of the FluxMED system is that creating
a workflow for a new disease takes only a few hours with
the help of a specialist. There is no need to change the
system in any way. Moreover, new systems can be integrated
with existing ones, so one EHR system can serve several
specialities, making it simpler to maintain the data, train users
and extend the system.
IV. IMPLEMENTING THE PROTOCOLS INTO FLUXMED
In FluxMED an EHR system is developed describing the
steps in the doctors’ consultation and treatment, and their
attributes. For example, in Figure 1 we show a screenshot
of NMO-DBr, the Brazilian Neuromyelitis database. In this
case the doctor examines his patients by first identifying them
through their name, address, and other information. This data
is stored in the first activity of NMO-DBr. Once a patient is
identified, the doctor can store what is called the First Index
Event. This disease is rare and difficult to diagnose. Doctors
establish their diagnostic by identifying what type of problems
patients have, and if a certain number of crises occur the
diagnostic is completed. Each crisis is called an Index Event.
Several index events can occur, and NMO-DBr can store all
of them and maintain their temporal relationship.
An EHR system inside FluxMED is then a series of ac-
tivities, each recording an aspect of the patients symptoms
and treatment. Symptoms and consultations can be stored
as separate activities in FluxMED, as well as exams and
treatments. The doctors using FluxMED then see the sequence
of activities that have been registered, and can view each of
them by selecting the activity name as seen in the left frame
of Figure 1.
FluxMED has a powerful access control system that grants
access permissions on an activity basis. In other words,
permissions can be granted or not per activity. An example
of usage could be for example, if you have four activities: 1.
Identification; 2. Electrocardiogram exam; 3. Blood exam; 4.
Diagnostic. Activities 2, 3 and 4 can only be executed after
activity 1. Figure 3 shows how FluxMED sees this example.
The way IA is implemented in FluxMED is by assigning
access permissions to each activity according to who can
access them. One use would be that activities 1 and 4 can only
be executed and by a general clinician. As shown in Figure 4,
Fig. 3: A simple workflow illustrating IA in FluxMED
(a) Screen showing access as a cardiologist
(b) Screen showing access as laboratory technician
Fig. 4: Screen behaviour under different roles
cardiologists can view activity 1 and execute activity 2, lab
technicians can view activity 1 and execute activity 3, and
the general clinician can view all activities. In this way, the
general clinician can view all exams and make the diagnostic.
Cardiologists and lab technicians can view the identification so
they will know who to exam. They will register their exams,
but will not see exams performed by other personnel.
Finally, the complete set of activities, called an instance
in FluxMED has as owner the patient who can see all four
activities and change permissions for his or her data.
One additional aspect of the IA protocols is, naturally
accountability. FluxMED registers all access activity in the
system. Each execution or modification of an activity is
registered. In addition to that, activities visualization is also
registered. So, if a user chooses to visualize an activity, this
fact is also registered in the system, so the patient can see a
full history of doctors and others healthcare professionals that
accessed his data, if they actually had enough privileges to see
this information (Figure 6).
This is a key point of the implemented protocol: the access
must be non-restrictive. A doctor, as a healthcare professional,
must have the access granted to any data of their patients if he
considers it necessary, for example, in an emergency case. On
the other hand the healthcare professional can be investigated
by the healthcare authority if the information is misused.
(a) Screen showing access as the general clinician
(b) Screen showing access as the data owner, or the Patient A
Fig. 5: Screen behaviour under different roles
Fig. 6: Possible information misuse are highlighted in
FluxMED
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The use of information accountability protocols enables the
creation of eHealth records that can be useful to both con-
sumers and healthcare professionals. By ensuring transparency
and accountability is applied, data owners (i.e. patients) are
aware of how and why their information is accessed and
used, while medical professionals are able to access all the
information they need to provide care to their patients and
make informed decisions. As a result, accountable-eHealth
systems create an environment where health information is
available to the right person at the right time without rigid
barriers, whilst empowering the consumers with control over
the use of their information.
In this paper, we have taken one step closer to realising
accountable-eHealth systems through implementing them in a
full EHR system, FluxMED, and demonstrating the function-
ality of the IAF protocols. Using this implementation, we are
working to further validate the approach through user testing
with the healthcare professionals and other users of FluxMED.
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